Aaro Suonio: “The demand of weapons before negotiating is seen as surrender”

A republican parade in North Ireland

Taken from: http://www.basquepeaceprocess.info/?p=6127

We’ll speak first of Northern Ireland where you were a protagonist. The decommissioning of the IRA took place in 2005, seven years after the peace agreements. Why not before? Do you think the IRA waited to see if the agreements materialized?

 

That is a really difficult question. At the beginning the British government put decommissioning as a previous condition for any peace dialogue. But that didn’t help. I’m not a politician, but a professional, and I speak from this prism. Many aspects of decommissioning continue to be kept secret and it isn’t necessary to enter into details.

It’s evident that there wouldn’t have been a dialogue if the question of decommissioning didn’t enter in the agenda. For this reason the British and Irish governments invited international personalities such as the former United States’ Senator George Mitchell, who in his report proposed the establishment of a separate organ that would deal with the question of dismantling. This was the way for which they achieved the beginning of the conversations. To plant it as a previous condition, decommissioning passes to be one more part of the agenda.

That of Ireland is a conflict in which there were no conquerors or conquered. The demand of turning over weapons before an inclusive negotiation is produced is seen as a petition for surrender. And supposedly we spoke of beginning a negotiation to achieve a political declaration, not of victories or defeats. Obviously, throughout the years, violence always generates many victims and distrust. When the people radicalize themselves to the point of taking up arms for political motives, it isn’t east to make a quick turn to the previous situation.

The people must be conscious that political processes are slow, because it is not just about turning over weapons, but how to transform the conflict, which covers many aspects. In building this confidence, London made an important movement releasing prisoners. We call this assuming risk, because it is not about a popular decision, above all to the families of the people who suffered the violence. But it opened an opportunity for those who held weapons.

Is it realistic to demand in the Basque case that the decommissioning of ETA comes before the agreements?

It is a situation that is similar to what there was in Northern Ireland when decommissioning was planted as a previous condition. But that posture didn’t work. What then was the valid formula? A process of inclusive negotiation. The opening of a negotiation gives you an opportunity to reach a political agreement in which decommissioning is included. If you observe other experiences apart from the Irish one, this decommissioning rarely comes before, but it is a product of a political process.

Decommissioning processes are basically a question of confidence?

At the beginning there aren’t usually spaces for confidence; these have to be built in different ways. In Ireland, one of the formulas to do that was to go to international facilitators to negotiate and consult with all the parts implicated; paramilitaries, governments and political prisoners. Another way was to invite international personalities to verify that the IRA hadn’t made use of the armaments that they had. This job was done in secret and still without having had decommissioning.